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In th.e Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
I<IMBALL ELEVA TOR COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ELEVATOR SUPPLIES COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
\ Case No. 8066 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT CONTROVERT 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rule 75 (p) ( 2) specifies: (tlf the respondent agrees with 
the statement of facts set forth in appellant's brief, he shall 
so indicate. If he controverts it, he shall state wherein such 
statement is inconsistent with the facts and he shall make a 
statement of facts as he finds them, giving reference to the 
places of the record supporting his statement and controverting 
appellant's statement.'' 
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Plaintiff and respondent does not point out wherein a 
single statement in the Brief of Appellant is inaccurate or 
unsupported by the record. Nor does the respondent refute 
the argun1ent and citations of authority in the Brief of Appel-
lant which show that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error. For the most part, the respondent attempts to side-step 
and ignore the admissions made by plaintiff at the trial which 
precluded the possibility of any contract whatsoever with de-
fendant, and which admissions demonstrated that plaintiff as 
unsuccessful bidder made outrageous claims which are wholly 
repugnant to law. 
Some authorities cited by respondent have no application 
to the actual facts of this case. Other citations support the con-
tentions of the appellant and do not sustain the claims of re-
spondent. 
RESPONDENT MISSTATES THE FACTS 
The initial sentence in the Brief of Respondent is typical 
of the misstatements of fact and misleading argument which 
characterize said brief: ((This is an action between an elevator 
company and an elevator parts supplier." 
Plaintiff did not sue defendant on any pretense that there 
was any subsisting contract to supply plaintiff anything. The 
trial court permitted plaintiff to recover for not being awarded 
a contract with Hotel Utah (R. 194). The amended complaint 
alleged an express oral agreement whereby defendant pur· 
portedly ((agreed" to submit to Utah Hotel Company a t(sup-
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porting bid" in a sum $18,000 or $19,000 in excess of plaintiff's 
bid, and ((violation" of such ((agreement" by submission of a 
firm bid instead and acceptance of an _award of a contract 
(R. 34-41). The theory was changed at the trial to nan implied 
agreement not to compete" with plaintiff, although competi-
tion was never specifically discussed (R. 632, 651). 
Respondent's statement of ((The Facts" on pages 2 to 
26 of its brief, omits nearly all of the material facts. Such 
statement distorts the written instruments, particular! y the 
numerous written offers which were never accepted and which 
expired. Respondent even contradicts the stipulations of fact 
and its own admissions by misstatement of the record. Most 
of the ((evidence" recited was inadmissible. Respondent ig-
nores the fact that it gave defendant very little business, and 
that respondent did most of its business with other companies. 
The fact that defendant also did most of its business with 
other companies is disregarded by respondent. Likewise, the 
respondent fails to mention that from and after 1948 the 
Utah Hotel Company was the customer of the defendant, not 
the customer of plaintiff. To a void needless repetition, some 
of the misstatements and distortions by respondent are men-
tioned in replying to the argument of ((Respondent's Positions." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS FOR REPLY TO 
((RESPONDENT'S POSITIONS" 
1. There is no factual basis for the contention that ((There 
was an agreement not to compete." 
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2. If an agreement had been made to restrain defendant 
from submitting a bid to the owner of a building, such agree-
ment would not have come under any exception to the anti-
trust acts. 
3. There was no legal consideration to support an "im-
plied agreement'' of any kind. 
4. Plaintiff recognized the right of Utah Hotel Company 
to obtain a firm bid from defendant. 
5. There was no basis for an award of any damages. 
6. The trial was unfair and prejudicial to defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CONTEN-
TION THAT ((THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT NOT TO 
COMPETE.'' 
Plaintiff knows that it could not possibly argue into exist-
ence from the negotiations relating to Hotel Utah any "im-
plied agreement'' whereby defendant would be restrained 
from giving the hotel a bona fide bid, for the hotel was then 
a customer of defendant. Plaintiff had no contract with defend-
ant of any nature or description. Plaintiff admitted that it knew 
the hotel wanted a bid from defendant, and that plaintiff told 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company that it was all right 
for Pacific to submit a bid to defendant, knowing that defend-
ant would use such bid (if reasonable) in computing its own 
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bid for submission to Utah Hotel Company (R. 374-375, 573, 
575). Plaintiff also admitted through its general manager that 
defendant made no promises (R. 589-590). 
Plaintiff tries to reach back into fruitless negotiations of 
years past for an argument about an ((implied argreement" 
which could not be spelled out from any competent evidence. 
Plaintiff relies on considerable inadmissible evidence. Such 
evidence not being helpful, plaintiff resorts to contradictions 
of the record and palpable misstatements of fact in an effort 
to argue into existence an ((implied agreement" out of un-
accepted offers and other negotiations in the past which re-
sulted in no contracts. The misstatements of fact in the argu-
ment of respondent are shocking, and they show that the re-
spondent cannot hope to sustain the unjust judgment by 
adherence to the basic facts. 
Plaintiff carefully refrains from mentioning any of the 
following facts which were either stipulated at the trial, estab-
lished by admissions of plaintiff, or from other undisputed 
evidence including written documents: (a) Plaintiff, except for 
occasional purchases of replacement parts by catalog number, 
obtained numerous detailed written bids from defendant, but 
in a period of 2 3 years plaintiff actually accepted only 7 of 
the offers, and one of the 7 contracts was later canceled 
(Exhibit 46). The five contracts since 1931 have been small 
jobs. (b) Although repeatedly getting bids from defendant, 
plaintiff never at any time purchased from defendant any 
dumb-waiter elevators, elevator controls or related equipment. 
Such items have been purchased from Pacific Elevator and 
Equipment Company, from Energy Company, and other firms. 
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(c) Just as most of plaintiff's business has been awarded to 
other companies, particularly with respect to equipment of 
any size, most of defendant's business has been awarded to it 
by companies other than plaintiff. (d) Excluding the passenger 
elevator projects and the dumb-waiter projects at Hotel Utah, 
by 1950 the plaintiff had ceased to even request the defendant 
to submit a bid for any substantial part of an elevator moderni-
zation project, as plaintiff had become the territorial represen-
tative of Pacific. (e) From and after February 1948, Utah 
Hotel Company was the customer of the defendant, not the 
customer of plaintiff. (R. 243-244, Exhibit 3, R. 415, 461, 480, 
482, 503, 505, 520-521, 847, 858-859). 
In the teeth of the foregoing facts summarized from the 
Brief of Appellant, plaintiff attempts to argue that there was 
some kind of nebulous ctimplied agreement" which precluded 
defendant from entering into a binding contract with defend-
ant's own customer, Utah Hotel Company. Plaintiff cites no 
authority to support its absurd contentions. As pointed out 
hereinafter, some of the cases cited by plaintiff show that de-
fendant acted entirely within its rights. 
As part of a misleading argument, on page 3 and on page 
26 of the Brief of Respondent, plaintiff attempts to picture 
itself as an ((original contractor" and the defendant as a mere 
((supplier as its very name designates it to be." Thus, plaintiff 
makes the absurd atten1pt to restrict and curtail the corporate 
powers and operations of defendant to that of a ««supplier" 
because of the name, ((Elevator Supplies Company, Inc." Of 
course, plaintiff cites no authority for such untenable argument. 
The fact is that plaintiff itself never acted as an original con-
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tractor on any new construction, and at no tit?e did plaintiff 
act as an original contractor except in the specific instances 
where plaintiff was awarded a contract by the building owners. 
Of the numerous projects on which plaintiff became an original 
contractor, in only 6 instances did any contractual relationship 
arise between plaintiff and defendant. The only one of any 
consequence was a subcontract awarded to defendant on Hotel 
Utah 24 years ago. The other five were only small contracts, 
and they did not begin to encompass the various types of 
equipment manufactured and sold by defendant. 
The declaration of respondent on page 26 that ((through 
a long course of business dealings the defendant established 
itself as a supplier and the plaintiff as an original contractor," 
is patently false. From 1931 to 1950 the defendant supplied 
plaintiff only a few times. Except for some occasional pur-
chases of replacement parts from defendant by catalog num-
ber, (which could not be procured from some other company), 
the plaintiff always requested the defendant to submit written 
bids on some particular portion of a specific project on which 
plaintiff wanted a price quotation (R. 461). During said entire 
20 year period ending August 1950!' out of the numerous 
bids plaintiff procured from defendant, plaintiff awarded only 
5 contracts other than the one which was cancelled. Each 
of the 5 contracts was relatively small, and except for 1 of 
them, each was a contract which called for materials to be 
installed; so that even as to the few items covered by contracts, 
defendant was not a mere supplier as plaintiff has pictured 
defendant to be, but a subcontractor. The contention that de-
fendant was merely a ((supplier as its very name designates it 
to be," is a myth. 
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Plaintiff purchased very little from defendant. In fact, 
plaintiff purchased most of its equipment from companies 
other than defendant. Plaintiff admitted that defendant did 
not quote and sell exclusively to plaintiff (R. 846, 856-858). 
Contrary to the assertions that plaintiff purchased control 
equipment from defendant, at no time did plaintiff ever issue 
a purchase order for any control equipment (R. ~80-482). 
Plaintiff generally purchased fr9m companies other than de-
fendant, the type of equipment which performed the same 
functions as equipment manufactured by defendant (R. 486, 
510-518) . On page 5 of the Brief of Respondent a claim is 
made which contradicts the express admissions of plaintiff: 
nAt no time did the plaintiff company receive or 
request quotations on systems competitive to that fur-
nished by the defendant (R. 302-303) ." 
By the simple expedient of denying that the equipment 
purchased by plaintiff from other manufacturers was not ((com-
petitive," the plaintiff attempts to make it appear that it was 
dealing exclusively with defendant, when most of the equip-
ment plait~.tiff purchased, whether on an installed or uninstalled 
basis, was purchased from companies other than defendant. 
Inasmuch as ttsynchron control" is a trade-name of one type 
of relay control manufactured by defendant, plaintiff's pious 
declaration that it never asked a competitor of defendant to 
quote on such materials, begs the question. It is like saying 
that plaintiff never purchased a Chevrolet or offered to purchase 
such particular make of automobile from Ford Motor Company. 
Control equipment is of various makes and manufacture, all 
designed to perform certain definite functions. 
10 
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The record shows conclusively that time after time the 
plaintiff requested quotations from defendant on dumb-waiter 
elevators, but in each instance where plaintiff became the 
original contractor the plaintiff purchased such type of equip-
ment from companies other than defendant (R. 503, 505, 874, 
948-949). Exhibit 14, a letter from plaintiff to defendant in 
June 1950, admits that plaintiff purchased such equipment 
from another company. Exhibits 32, -3,9, 41 and 46 show that 
companies other than plaintiff purchased from defendant dumb-
waiter elevators. 
Contrary to the contention of respondent on pages 26 
to 27 of its brief that nit was uniform practice for the plaintiff 
to submit specifications on a job to the defendant and request 
quotations on elevator materials f. o. b. or on control systems 
installed at the job site," the exhibits introduced by plaintiff 
show that in 1950 (except on the Hotel Utah projects) the 
plaintiff limited its requests for defendant to bid to small items 
only. The plaintiff did not even request any bid on control 
systems in 1950 on the Charleston Apartments, Congress Hotel, 
University Heights Apartments, and Deseret News Building. 
The plaintiff as representative of Pacific Elevator and Equip-
ment Company requested quotations on the control systems 
from Pacific, not from defendant (R. 510-518). 
On the Park Building job in 1949, plaintiff asked defendant 
to bid on the relay controls as well as other equipment to 
Murphy Elevator Company. In 1950 plaintiff asked for a 
direct bid which defendant submitted. Later on, plaintiff re-
quested defendant to submit a bid on only a very small portion 
of the job, excluding entirely the controls. The plaintiff 
11 
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awarded a contract for the controls to Pacific Elevator and 
Equipment Company (R. 510-518). 
The argument on page 28 of the Brief of Appellant is 
contrary to the facts: 
((The· parties to this action were never competitors 
nor did they ever deal at arm's length. The plaintiff was 
selling the defendant's supplies and control systems and 
it was incumbent upon plaintiff to deal with the de-
fendant after the plaintiff had· urged the customer to 
use defendant's system and after plaintiff made its 
bid based upon quot ations received from the defend-
ant.'' 
The plaintiff was not selling defendant's supplies. Plaintiff 
was neither the agent nor territorial representative of defendant. 
On the other hand plaintiff was territorial representative of 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, which manufactured 
and sold equipment which performed the same functions as 
equipment manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff finally ad-
mitted at the trial that it purchased from others the. type of 
equipment manufactured and sold by defendant (R. 505). 
Plaintiff certainly was not urging any building owner to use 
defendant's equipment, when plaintiff was not even taking a 
bid from defendant on most of the equipment manufactured 
by defendant, but on the other hand was taking bids from 
and issuing purchase orders to Pacific Elevator and Equipment 
Company. Such was the situation in 1950. 
Plaintiff furnished no specifications on Hotel Utah. It was 
not the plaintiff that had defendant's materials specified on 
that job. The defendant had been contracting with Utah Hotel 
12 
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Company since February 1948, and it was the management 
of the hotel which specified defendant's equipment. On page 
19 of the Brief of Respondent it is stated that when Hotel Utah 
informed the plaintiff that the hotel wanted a bid frotn de-
fendant, Mr. Connole of Kimball suggested Westinghouse 
Electric Company. Since Westinghouse would not likely quote 
on defendant's equipment, there is no substance to the pre-
tense that plaintiff was trying to sell defendant's equipment. 
Plaintiff knew that the hotel wanted defendant's equipment 
used as far as possible, and the attempt to discourage the hotel 
from getting a bid from defendant and to induce the hotel 
to get a bid from Westinghouse, refute the claim that plaintiff 
was trying to sell defendant's equipment. 
The plaintiff attempts to make it appear that plaintiff 
was responsible for having defendant's equipment specified 
in the Medical Arts Building, which defendant ultimately 
installed under a contract with Murphy Elevator Company. 
However, Alma J. Janke, plaintiff's own witness, testified that 
it was on his own recommendation that Elevator Supplies 
control equipment was specified on the job, following various 
conversations with Roy C. Smjth and after making an inspec-
tion trip to defendant's plant. Mr. Janke, who was formerly 
an employee of Otis Elevator Company, knew that Otis manu-
factured equipment which performed similar functions (R. 
452, 454). 
On page 11 of its brief, respondent states that in 1949 
defendant submitted a proposal on an elevator project at 
the Pioneer Memorail Building. Plaintiff fails to mention that 
defendant submitted an identical bid to Elevator Service and 
13 
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Supply Company of Salt Lake City, and that it was not the 
plaintiff, but Elevator Service and Supply Company which 
awarded the contract to defendant. 
On page 12 plaintiff states that Mr. Connole of Kimball 
and Mr. Smith of Elevator Supplies Co., Inc., went together 
to the Dooley Building in 1948, and that defendant furnished 
plaintiff cuts and illustrative material. Plaintiff neglects to men-
tion that defendant furnished the same information to other 
companies, including Elevator Service and Supply Company 
and the Montgomery Elevator Co. On page 27 respondent 
further states: 
(( ... Frequently representatives of the parties would 
consult and collaborate on specifications and designs 
most suitable for the customer. On many occasions rep-
resentatives of both parties ·would jointly confer with 
a customer or building owners and thereafter-based 
upon quotations made by the defendant to the plaintiff 
-plaintiff would bid the overall and complete job .. " 
The statement is highly misleading. The defendant also 
went to building owners with representatives of other elevator 
companies. Defendant was interested in selling its own equip-
ment, and also to ascertain how its equipment could be synchro-
nized with equipmept which would remain or with equipment 
which might be installed by others. Plaintiff could cite only 3 
instances where defendant's representative ever went to a 
building owner with plaintiff's representative. One was the 
Medical Arts Building in 1947, on which defendant was 
ultimately awarded a contract by Murphy Elevator Company. 
Another was the Dooly Building in 1948 which defendant 
bid to two different companies although never awarded any 
14 
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contract, and the other was the Continental Bank Building in 
1949. The statement on page 13 to the effect that defendant 
participated with plaintiff and Pacific in the preparation of 
"an engineer's estimate" is wholly unsupported by the record 
(R. 343). Mr. Connole represented to defendant that the Con-
tinental Bank Building management wanted a bid on the 
project, and after plaintiff twice procured bids from defendant 
which defendant prepared at considerable expense to defendant, 
the plaintiff did not even bother to submit a bid to Continental 
Bank Building management (R. 475-477). 
Plaintiff argues that defendant ((worked with'' plaintiff 
to "get business together." The implic~tion is that plaintiff 
always purchased from defendant, which is contrary to the 
admitted facts. Plaintiff admitted that it purchased similar 
equipment from other companies (R. 503, 505) . Likewise, 
plaintiff admitted that defendant did not quote and sell ex-
clusively to the plaintiff (R. 846, 856-858). On pages 6 to 
16 of the Brief of Respondent, reference is made to numerous 
requests for bids and submission of bids, only one of which 
was ever accepted by plaintiff. The one contract which came 
into being was later cancelled. In more than 20 years the 
plaintiff accepted only 7 offers out of the multitude of offers 
procured from defendant. Through a long course of getting 
bids from defendant, with few exceptions, plaintiff awarded 
contracts to other companies. Of the total of 6 contracts which 
were awarded to defendant, each one was in utmost detail, 
and not one contained any covenant that defendant would 
either deal with the plaintiff in the future. or refrain frotn deal-
ing with a particular person or group of persons. 
15 
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The contract on the Walker Bank Building awarded to 
defendant by plaintiff was cancelled at the request of plaintiff. 
On page 9 of its brief respondent makes the following claim 
with respect thereto: tCPlaintiff protected the defendant on 
the job by insisting that as a condition to the cancellation the 
defendant be awarded the supply of electrical power door 
operators (R. 3 56) ." Such assertion is not a fair statement 
of the competent evidence. The defendant had a binding con-
tract with plaintiff, and such contract could not be cancelled 
without consent of defendant. Defendant obtained $2,000 
from the building management as the maximum amount 
plaintiff would have to pay defendant for cancellation. Plain-
tiff paid only $1,000 to defendant which certainly did not 
((protect" defendant when it had incurred expenses of $2,000 
(R. 43 5-440). Furthermore, plaintiff had nothing to do with 
defendant's submission of a bid to Otis Elevator Company 
on- the furnishing and installation of door operating mech-
anisms. Otis asked defendant for a bid because the Otis equip-
ment would not fit into the openings (R. 870). If Otis could 
have made its own equipment work, it would not have asked 
defendant to install any of defendant's equipment. The case 
illustrates the fact that defendant treated all elevator com-
panies alike by allowing a discount of 10% from list price. 
On page 29 plaintiff states in defiance of all rules of 
contract, and contrary to the evidence: 
( c • • • The defendant through its long course of 
dealings merely promised it would not quote direct to 
a building management where plaintiff had requested 
a quotation from the defendant and plaintiff had there· 
after submitted a bid to the building management." 
16 
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Never at any time did plaintiff impose any such restriction 
in any request for bid, and notwithstanding the defendant 
went into the most minute detail in submitting a written bid 
to plaintiff as well as to other companies, the subject of refrain-
ing from competition is not mentioned in any bid submitted 
either to plaintiff, to Murphy, Montgomery, Elevator Service 
and Supply Con1pany, or any other company. Furthermore, 
plaintiff disregards the fact that there could be no contract 
when there was an unaccepted offer. When we examine the 
six contracts which plaintiff actually awarded, each one re-
lates to a specifiic project and there is no covenant to transact 
any business on some other project nor to refrain from dealing 
with the owner. What plaintiff still seeks to do is to create a 
fictitious ((implied agreement" out of a series of unaccepted 
offers and other fruitless negotiations which came to naught. 
Plaintiff says in effect that the failure of defendant in one 
instance or a s_eries of instances to submit a bid direct! y to 
the owner of the building implied a negative promise to re-
frain in the future from submitting any bid to a building 
owner. The argument is absurd. 
In this case, Utah Hotel Company had been the customer 
of defendant since February 1948. Defendant was an original 
cont,ractor from 1948 to 1950 on the sale and delivery of 
repair equipment (R. 243-244, 770-771, 779-782). Neverthe-
less, in contradiction of the testimony of its witness Max C. 
Carpenter, plaintiff repeatedly makes the unfounded statement 
that prior to September 27, 1950, defendant had not acted as 
an original contractor in Utah. Even if plaintiff had been right 
instead of wrong, it would have been entirely immaterial, for 
17 
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the defendant had the absolute right to change its own policy 
and begin to operate as an original contractor at any time. 
Certainly the defendant did not have to consult plaintiff nor 
any other elevator company. Plaintiff infers that once having 
acted as a subcontractor for plaintiff on some project, defendant 
thereafter could not operate on some other project as an 
original contractor. The plaintiff cites no authority for such 
a concept as it is contrary to every fundamental rule of freedom 
of contract. 
Plaintiff seeks to obscure the fact that plaintiff obtained 
its bid from defendant on Hotel Utah dated June 14, 1950, 
by falsely representing that the hotel was awarding the job 
to plaintiff. Plaintiff neglects to mention, of course, that such 
bid obtained by deceit was never accepetd and never resulted 
in a binding contract whatsoever, and that said bid was with-
drawn by letter dated September 8, 1950, after plaintiff's bid 
was rejected by Utah Hotel Company. After the defend-
ant submitted a new bid to plaintiff following submission 
of a bid to Utah Hotel Company, ~nd after Pacific submitted 
its revised bid to plaintiff on September 15, 1950, the plaintiff 
did not even bother to sub1nit a new bid to Utah Hotel Company. 
In September 1950 plaintiff was in the same position as if it 
had never submitted a bid at all. 
On page 26 of the Brief of Respondent it is admitted 
that officials of Hotel Utah nwere openly antagonistic to the 
plaintiff's cause," but plaintiff contends that nprior to the 
filing of the lawsuit the plaintiff enjoyed a very good business 
relationship with the Hotel Utah and with its personnel." The 
record refutes the last quoted statement, for the hotel ceased 
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to do business with plaintiff back in February 1948 due to 
dissatisfaction over a small service elevator installed by plaintiff 
which had to be removed, and also due to failure of plaintiff 
to give the hotel good service. The business relation between 
plaintiff and the hotel went down to zero. Beginning in Feb-
ruary 1948 the hotel contracted direct with defendant, and 
the hotel was the customer of defendant (not the customer of 
plaintiff) thereafter. When Kimball submitted its incomplete 
bid dated August 16, 1950, to Utah Hotel Company, the hotel 
not only rejected such bid which omitted 15 essential items, 
but the hotel refused to even entertain any further bid from 
plaintiff (R. 263-264, 822). 
Plaintiff never accepted any offer it obtained from de-
fendant on Hotel Utah. In fact Mr. Connole testified that 
Kimball never accepted a proposal from a proposed contractor 
until or unless Kimball was awarded the contract (R. 43 5) . 
Plaintiff furnished defendant no specifications on the hotel 
elevator modernization or dumb-waiter elevator installation 
projects. The plaintiff had no contract, express or implied. 
It is stated on page 20 that Mr. Henker of Pacific testified 
that he thought the hotel management wanted a ((check bid, 
and naturally it was going to be higher." Reference to said 
incompetent statement is disposed of by his admission on 
cross-examination that he came to Salt Lake City for the pur-
pose of making a detailed investigation of the project for 
the purpose of submitting to defendant a firm bid (R. 676, 
716-718). Pacific not only submitted a firm bid on September 
7, 1950, but it accepted a purchase order from defendant. 
The plaintiff ignores the fundamental rule that the testimony 
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of a witness zs no stronger than where it ts left on cross-
examination. 
Plaintiff relies on incompetent evidence of Mr. Connole 
who contradicted the terms and provisions of Exhibit "I" 
dated August 16, 1950, by saying that said bid included all 
of the work stated in defendant's bid except the drive sheaves. 
At least 15 items essential to the job were omitted. Utah Hotel 
Company did not regard the bid as satisfactory, and it had 
the unquestioned legal right to reject that bid, which it did on 
August 17, 1950, before it called upon defendant to submit 
a bid on the overall job (R. 246-247, 263-264, 787-788). 
Plaintiff never bothered to submit any further bid to the hotel 
although both Pacific and defendant submitted new bids early 
in September 1950 in the light of conditions which they learned 
from the hotel management (R. 542). 
Since the bid dated September 12, 1950, to plaintiff (Ex-
hibit LLL) was submitted to plaintiff by defendant after 
defendant had already submitted a bid on the overall projects 
to the hotel (Exhibits J and 4), the argument of plaintiff 
that defendant impliedly promised not to give a bid to the 
building owner is absurd. It is impossible to imply something 
which contradicts the known facts. The text quoted from by 
plaintiff on pages 27 and 28 does not hold that a contract can 
be implied from an unaccepted offer, nor a promise implied 
which contradicts the facts. There ·is no competent evidence 
of any agreement. 
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Point 2 
IF AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE TO RE-
STRAIN DEFENDANT FROM SUBMITTING A BID TO 
THE OWNER OF A BUILDING, SUCH AGREEMENT 
WOULD NOT HAVE COME UNDER ANY EXCEPTION 
TO THE ANTI-TRUST ACTS. 
On pages 28 and 29 of the Brief of Respondent it 1s 
argued: 
c]t is neither the intent nor purpose of the Sherman 
Act or the Clayton Act to nullify or abolish agreements 
necessarily made in the ordinary and regular channels 
of trade ... " 
First of all, there was no agreement at all, as plaintiff 
failed to accept any offer made by defendant to plaintiff with 
respect to Hotel Utah in 1950. In the second place, an agreement 
to refrain from submitting an honest bid to the owner of a 
building could not possibly be an agreement ((necessarily made 
in the ordinary and regular channels of trade,'' for there is 
no trade if there is no contract, and without acceptance of an 
offer to sell there is no contract. Plaintiff also makes the follow-
ing specious contention: 
(( . . . The plaintiff, without such an understanding, 
would find itself in the anamalous and always risky 
position of seeking quotations from the defendant, 
then attempting to compete on a price to the customer. 
American free enterprise would suffer, if such were 
the law." 
American free enterprise does not countenance agree-
ments whereby a manufacturer and a prospective occasional 
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purchaser agree that the manufacturer shall refrain from selling 
to any particular person or to any group of persons. American 
free enterprise would be destroyed if the owner of property 
could not get a bona fide offer from a responsible firm which 
it has patronized for over two years. The idea that a property 
owner cannot sell to his own customer is not free enterprise. 
It is anything but ((free enterprise" if the owner cannot get 
a competitive bid on the same type of equipment and materials 
the owner specifies. The"'Other companies with which defendant 
did most of its business made no such specious claim as 
plaintiff makes. 
Defendant went as far as it could legitimately go in 
allowing all elevator companies a uniform discount from 
list price of 10%, since the building owner could not get such 
a discount. The plaintiff infers that a party is never safe in 
bidding if the manufacturer underbids. Such is not the case 
here, as the defendant did not give Utah Hotel Company a 
lower bid, but defendant gave the plaintiff a lower bid by 
offering plaintiff the usual elevator company discount, but 
such discount was not offered to.Utah Hotel Company. 
Plaintiff has the audacity to say that the ccagreement" 
which it tries to argue into existence would not tend to a re-
straint of trade or monopoly. The very nature of such agree-
ment is to restrain the owner from getting a bona fide bid and 
would not only tend toward monopoly, but it would be a 
criminal offense as a conspiracy under the Sherman Act. 
All the way through its argument, plaintiff ignores the 
fact that Utah Hotel Company was the customer of defendant, 
not the customer of plaintiff; and that upon the withdrawal of 
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defendant's original offer of June 14, 1950, the parties were 
in the same position as if no offer had been made, for at that 
time plaintiff's bid to the hotel had been rejected. Defendant 
did not submit its new offer to plaintiff (also subject to the 
elevator company discount of 10%) until after defendant had 
submitted its bona fide offer on the entire project to Hotel Utah 
at the request of the hotel company. Since the defendant had 
already given the hotel a bona fide offer, there could not 
possibly have been any rrimplied promiseJJ on the part of 
defendant to refrain from giving the hotel a bona fide bid. 
Of the various cases and texts cited by plaintiff in its 
brief, not one of them states that defendant did not have 
the right to do just exactly what defendant did in this case. 
Not a single case is offered to show that the submission of 
a bid to a prospective original contractor {(implies an agree-
ment to refrain from submitting a bid direct! y to the owner." 
No case can be found, for such contention is utterly contrary 
to law. The case of Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Derby Mfg. Co., 
94 Conn. 311, 109 A. 395, on which the trial court held de-
fendant was precluded from submitting a bid to Utah Hotel 
Company is clearly not in point; for that case involved a bail-
ment of plaintiff's goods. The court in that case held in effect 
that since the plaintiff furnished defendant the copper from 
which the defendant agreed to manufacture copper bands for 
plaintiff under an express written contract defendant could 
not bid against plaintiff with respect to such bailments of 
plaintiff's property. 
This case did not involve any materials of plaintiff. The 
plaintiff did not furnish defendant anything. The defendant 
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was using its own materials. Contrary to the assertions of 
plaintiff, plaintiff did not furnish any specifications. The other 
cases cited by plaintiff in its brief refute the contentions of 
plaintiff. As pointed out in Federal Trade Commission v. Ray-
mond Bros. Clark Co., 263, U. S. 564, 44 S. Ct. 162, 68 L. Ed. 
448, 30 A. L. R. 1114, cited by respondent at page 32, a whole-
saler may stop dealing with a manufacturer if he does not 
like the manufacturer's policies or if t'the thinks such manu-
facturer is undermining his trade by selling either to a com-
petitive wholesaler or to a retailer competing with his own 
customers." The same case holds that if one of them does 
an act which would be lawful in and of itself, it might become 
a conspiracy prohibited by law ttif the result be hurtful to 
the public or the individual against whom the concerted action 
is directed.'' 
The rule cited by plaintiff in 36 Am. Jur. at 504 refutes 
the contention of plaintiff, for it holds that where a person is 
not bound by contract (and certainly the defendant was not 
bound by contract to plaintiff when plaintiff failed and neg-
lected to accept any of it offers) , he might refuse to sell his 
property to any other person (such as plaintiff), ttand any 
loss or injury thereby inflicted upon the other person is damnem 
absqu injuria, and gives rise to no legal liability." 
The cases cited by plaintiff to the effect that a restraint 
may be reasonable where a party imposes the restraint to pro-
tect his business have no application to this case. Defendant 
itnposed no restraint. The plaintiff was not the territorial 
agent nor in any sense the representative of defendant. Plain-
tiff had no authority over defendant. The restraint which 
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plaintiff seeks to impose upon defendant retroactively cer-
tainly was not necessary to protect the business of defendant. 
Plaintiff practiced deceit on both defendant and upon Utah 
Hotel Company in an effort to prevent the hotel from getting 
a bona fide bid from defendant. Plaintiff sought to deprive 
the hotel of an honest bid by a responsible party and to 
monopolize the bidding. Furthermore, whatever method of 
doing business had been practiced in the past by the defendant 
was not subject to the dictates of plaintiff as an occasional pur-
chaser. The defendant alone had the right to change that 
method and it did not have to consult the l?laintiff about it as 
there was no existing contract with which such a change 
could interfere. 
Plaintiff cannot bring within any exception to the Sherman 
Act its scheme to deprive Hotel Utah of its right as a customer 
of defendant, to obtain a bona fide bid from defendant. Plain-
tiff was properly frustrated in it~ corrupt and vicious scheme 
to deprive the hotel company of its rights as a property owner 
to obtain a bona fide bid from defendant. 
Point 3 
THERE WAS NO LEGAL CONSIDERATION TO 
SUPPORT AN (]MPLIED AGREEMENT" OF ANY KIND. 
On page 36 of its brief respondent tries to create consider-
ation out of negotiations which failed: 
((Defendant does not recognize the time, effort and 
expense occasioned on plaintiff's part in securing good 
will, local contacts, copies of specifications, and esti-
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mations including the defendant's materials and relay 
systems on a job ... '' 
All of those acts were done for the benefit of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff certain! y does not claim to be indebted to de-
fendant for the enormous expense which defendant ·was put 
to in submitting to plaintiff scores of bids in utmost detail on 
numerous projects during a period of 23 years which were 
never accepted. After inducing the defendant to submit two 
separate bids on the Continental Bank Building, which in-
volved defendant in substantial expense, the plaintiff did not 
even bother to submit a bid to the building management. To 
quote further misstatements of plaintiff: 
n ••• It was shown by a positive preponderance of 
the evidence that the plaintiff constantly and without 
exception attempted to convince the prospects of the 
superior quality of the defendant's signal and relay 
control system; that plaintiff did not seek quotations 
on such systems from the defendant's competitors; 
that the defendant knew plaintiff was dealing exclu-
sively with the defendant in this regard; and that de-
fendant knew plaintiff was estimating and including 
defendant's equipment specifically in its quotations 
to the customer or building owners . . . " 
The contention that plaintiff was ((constantly and without 
exception" trying to convince the prospects of the ((superior 
quality of the defendant's signal and relay 5=0ntrol system" is 
utterly false, as demonstrated by the fact that in 1950 plaintiff 
was not trying to get anyone to use defendant's relay control 
systems. The plaintiff did not invite defendant to bid on such 
systems, but invited Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company 
to quote on controls on the Charleston Apartments, the Deseret 
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News Building, Congress Hotel, and University Heights 
Apartments. The reverse of plaintiff's statement is true, for 
in 1950 only on Hotel Utah did plaintiff ask defendant to 
bid on controls, and that was due to the fact that the hotel had 
indicated that it wanted bids on defendant's equipment. When 
Kimball was informed by the hotel that the hotel wanted a bid 
from defendant on the overall job, plaintiff tried to discourage 
the hotel from getting a bid from defendant, and even recom-
mended that Hotel Utah procure a bid from Westinghouse 
which would not likely use any of defendant~ s equipment. 
Such is an example of how plaintiff ({constantly and without 
exception" tried to get defendant's materials used. A further 
classic example relates to dumb-waiter elevators on which 
plaintiff requested bids from defendant on many occasions, 
yet without exception plaintiff purchased such equipment from 
competitors of defendant (R. 480-482) . The contention that 
plaintiff did not seek quotations on such equipment from 
defendant's competitors and ((that the defendant knew plaintiff 
was dealing exclusively with the defendant in this regard," 
completely defy the facts (R. 510-518). There were never any 
exclusive dealings, and in 2 3 years the plaintiff accepted only 
7 of the multitude of offers it procured from defendant. Cer-
tainly, there was no consideration furnished by failure to accept 
numerous offers, and no contracts resulted from such unac-
cepted offers. 
Plaintiff further indulges in patent misstatements of fact 
on page 36: 
cc • • Also there was certainly a promise from the 
defendant to the plaintiff that when plaintiff requested 
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and secured a quotation on Elevator Supplies rnaterial 
and thereafter based thereon made plaintiff's bid to 
the customer including defendant's material, that de· 
fendant would not bid direct! y to that customer . . . " 
Defendant made no promise except what was detailed 
specifically in writing in its bids. Those promises could not 
become binding without acceptance. The subject of competi-
tion or refraining from competition never arose in any discus-
sion. Plaintiff still insists that an unaccepted offer creates an 
implied agreement on the part of the offeror to do something 
or to refrain from doing something which was never the subject 
of any negotiations. The following contention is likewise with-
out substance: 
t t • There was also a promise running from the 
plaintiff to use defendant's material since it was un-
equivocally established such was all plaintiff ever speci-
fied and estimated." 
An offeree promises nothing by merely receiving a bid. 
Since there was no acceptance and consequently no contract, 
there was no promise of any kind and no consideration. But 
it is rather shocking to read statement after statement which 
is utterly false. Plaintiff knows very well that it never at any 
time purchased a dumb-waiter from defendant, notwithstanding 
the many quotations thereon which plaintiff procured from 
defendant. Such equipment was invariably purchased by plain-
tiff from companies other than defendant. Plaintiff knows 
very well, too, that it never at any time purchased any control 
equipment from defendant, but that it purchased control 
equipment from Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company 
(R. 480-482, 486, 510-518). 
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On pages 3 7 and 38 plaintiff has the audacity to say: 
Ct . . . The defendant company, after having asso-
ciated with plaintiff for more than twenty-five years, 
would now assert that the representation of the plain-
tiff and the close business association of the parties 
was absolutely of no value." 
What does plaintiff mean by saying defendant nassociated" 
with plaintiff? The claim of nrepresentation" is entirely false. 
Plaintiff now seeks to appoint itself nrepresentative" of defend-
ant. How Ctclose business association" could there be in a 
situation where plaintiff in 23 years induced defendant to sub-
mit offers on numerous jobs, but when awarded contracts plain-
tiff invariably failed to purchase anything from defendant 
except in 6 specific instances? The preparation of bids over 
a period of years, nearly all of which were unaccepted, con-
stituted a liability, not an asset to defendant. 
On page 38 the plaintiff continues to indU:lge 1n filS-
statements, none of which show any consideration whatsoever. 
The contention that ((it was of direct value to the defendant 
to have its equipment quoted for sale," infers that plaintiff 
was quoting to prospective customers on defendant's equip-
ment when such was not the case. Likewise, there is no basis 
to the assertion that nthere was an irrevocable commitment 
made by the Kimball Elevator Company to the Elevator Sup-
plies Company to purchase the material, if the plaintiff were 
awarded a job." The contention is palpably false, since plaintiff 
repeatedly obtained bids from defendant and then purchased 
the same type of equipment from Pacific and from other com-
panies. The concept that defendant might have obtained some 
imaginary benefit from something complimentary which plain-
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tiff might have said on some occ~sion about defendant's 
equipment, could not constitute any consideration nor create 
a contract to refrain from submittipg a bid to anyone except 
plaintiff in the future. 
The entire argument that there was consideration for an 
((implied agreement" which was supposed to have arisen out of 
an unaccepted offer is absurd. 
Point 4 
PLAINTIFF RECOGNIZED THE RIGHT OF UTAH 
HOTEL COMPANY TO OBTAIN A FIRM BID FROM 
DEFENDANT. 
There is no competent evidence of any agreement to re-
frain from submitting a bona fide bid to Utah Hotel Company. 
The hotel having been a customer of defendant for more than 
two years, any agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
whereby defendant would refrain from giving the hotel a bona 
fide bid would have been fraudulent and void. 
On page 41 plaintiff says that any ({quotation by Elevator 
Supplies could only be an estimate," which is not true. The 
contention that the ((facts were on the table as far as plaintiff 
and the hotel were concerned" is unfounded as far as plaintiff 
is concerned. Nor were there any ((forthright statements to the 
Hotel Utah by Connole," as alleged on page 42. Plaintiff 
knew the hotel wanted a bid on the entire job from defendant. 
Plaintiff sought to prevent submission of such bid in the first 
instance by falsely representing to defendant that Kimball 
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was going to be awarded the job, then by telling the hotel 
building superintendent that it would do no good to ask 
defendant for a bid (R. 523-524, 78~-787, 818). 
The assertion that Mr. Henker was of the impression 
that the hotel wanted a ((check bid or an estimate," and that 
((any estimate given by them to the hotel would be so much 
higher that necessarily the job would automatically go to 
Kimball,' disregards the complete revision of Mr. Henker's 
testimony on cross-examination when he stated that he came 
to Salt Lake City for the purpose of making a detailed exami-
nation at the job site for the purpose of making a firm bid 
to Elevator Supplies Co., Inc. (R. 676, 716-718). Plaintiff 
tries to evade the admissions of plaintiff that Mr. Connole 
told Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific to give de-
fendant a bid, as plaintiff knew that defendant was bidding 
on the job (R. 5 72-5 73). Pacific was plaintiff's principal, and 
Pacific declined to give a firm quotation until it was assured 
by plaintiff that it was all right to do so (R. 67 4) . The plaintiff 
has nothing to complain about, for it recognized the right 
of the hotel as the customer of defendant to obtain a bid 
in good faith from defendant, and also the absolute right 
of defendant to submit a firm bid. 
The admissions of plaintiff shatter all pretense of some 
((implied agreement not to compete." No such ((agreement" 
could have existed at all, and certainly, no such ((agreement" 
could have been implied in the face of the admissions of 
plaintiff that it told Pacific it was all right to submit a bid 
to defendant, when plaintiff knew such bid would be used in 
defendant's bid to Utah Hotel Company. 
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Point 5 
THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF ANY 
DAMAGES. 
Plaintiff glosses over the fact that notwithstanding Mr. 
Connole testified that the Kimball bid of August 16, 1950, 
was supposed to cover the whole job, there were at least 15 
items which had been omitted and that the costs which plain-
tiff omitted from its alleged nestimate" (which was prepared 
after this suit was instituted), would have precluded the 
possibility of any profit and would have resulted in a loss. 
There is no basis in the record for the assertion that C!The 
plaintiff invited the court and jury to scrutinize its books and 
records." Exhibit SSS was prepared_ after this suit began. It 
was wholly incompetent and prejudicial. 
There is no factual basis for the assertion that Roy C. 
Smith ((repeatedly indicated that the Kimall people knew their 
· business." 
There is no foundation for the assertion that Utah Hotel 
Company would have allowed plaintiff to install its name-
plates in the elevator cabs. In the first place, plaintiff precluded 
itself from getting the job by its indisposition to submit a 
satisfactory and complete bid. Furthermore, the management 
of Hotel Utah would not allow name-plates except the name 
of the cab manufacturer in small letters on the capacity plates 
(R. 249, 259-260, 834-835). There was no competent evidence 
that the hotel's consent could have been obtained. The owner 
does not have to permit advertising. 
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The cases cited by plaintiff on page 50 do not sustain the 
position of the plaintiff that plaintiff could advertise itself as 
the manufacturer when it manufactured none of the equip-
ment. In no event could an installer advertise without the 
consent of the owner, and there was no such consent. There 
was no proof that plaintiff would have been awarded a con-
tract, and no proof that it would have been allowed to install 
any name-plates. Consequently there could have been no 
damage. 
Point 6 
THE TRIAL WAS UNFAIR AND PREJUDICIAL TO 
DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff Cloes not point out wherein a single error cited 
by appellant was (Charmless" error. In the first place, the 
trial court should have dismissed for failure to state a cause 
of action. In the second place, the defendant was entitled to 
a directed verdict of no cause of action. In the third place, 
the trial court violated numerous rules of law and due process 
at the trial. As pointed out in the Brief of Appellant, the 
court proclaimed a fictitious ((preliminary contract of nego-
tiations''-something alien to the law. The court permitted 
plaintiff to introduce incompetent evidence. The court also 
excluded evidence of the defendant. The court first ruled that 
"Vvhether there had been exclusive dealings would be immaterial. 
Then after it was stipulated that the dealings were not exclu-
sive either on the part of plaintiff or of defendant, the court 
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charged the jury that it could find an implied agreement not 
to compete from nexclusive dealings." The court misdirected 
the jury. The court refused to construe the written instruments, 
and permitted the jury to find an implied contract from un-
accepted offers and other negotiations which had terminated 
unsuccessfully. The court refused to present defendant's theory 
to the jury. Yet the plaintiff says that the trial was fair. The 
record shrieks of prejudicial error. The trial court neglected to 
cure the prejudicial error in denying defendant's motion for 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Brief of Appellant points out numerous prejudicial 
errors. The Brief of Respondent does not squarely controvert 
the Brief of Appellant. Instead, respondent misstates the facts, 
ignores the admissions of plaintiff, and distorts the written 
instruments. 
The plaintiff proved no agreement, since it admitted it 
did not accept the offers it procured on the Hotel Utah in 1950. 
This case arises out of the refusal of defendant as successful 
bidder to pay a {(commission" to plaintiff as unsuccessful bidder. 
No claim of any {(agreement" not to give Hotel Utah a bona fide 
bid was made until after this action was instituted. The claims 
of plaintiff are fictitious iQ. fact and in law. 
There is no basis for the verdict nor for the adverse rulings 
and judgment of the trial court. Defendant respectfully re-
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quests this Honorable Court to reverse the judgment in accord-
ance with the request in the Brief of Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL E. REIMANN 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
HOWARD ]. CANTUS 
30 Church Street 
New York City, New York 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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